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Introduction
Polio is a faecal-orally transmitted, highly
infectious disease caused by wild-type polio
virus (WPV) types 1, 2 or 3.1 2 Today, the
majority of polio outbreaks are caused by
circulating vaccine-derived polio viruses
(cVDPV) originating from back-mutations of
oral polio vaccine (OPV) viruses which have
recovered the WPV phenotype properties
of neurovirulence and transmissibility; most
cVDPV originate from type 2 OPV.3–5 Type 2
WPV has been eradicated already since 1999
and type 3 WPV has no longer been detected
since November 2012.6 Thus, the major challenges now are posed by remaining WPV type
1 and by cVDPV.7

Early, but truncated success
In 1988—8 years after the successful eradication of smallpox—the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was established as a
public–private partnership with the goal to
eradicate polio by the year 2000. Back then,
the annual global number of polio cases was
around 350 000 and the disease was endemic
in 125 countries.6 The main interventions of
the GPEI were to increase OPV coverage—
later replaced by inactivated polio vaccine
(IPV) in industrialised countries—through
the routine Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) of the WHO, and mass vaccination
campaigns.6 Subsequent modelling studies
indicated that polio eradication, as compared
with control, would be more cost-effective
and ultimately incur substantial net benefits.8 9 These studies were, however, criticised
as depending on untenable or at least highly
optimistic assumptions.10–12
The initial results of the GPEI were impressive, with a rapid reduction in the numbers
of global polio cases and endemic countries.
Eradication, however, was neither achieved by
the year 2000, nor were new deadlines met
in the following years.4 6 13 Since 2012, the
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Summary box
►► The Global Polio Eradication Initiative was estab-

lished in 1988 when polio was endemic in 125
countries causing some 350 000 clinical cases per
year. Today, the number of polio cases has been reduced by 99.9% and polio remains endemic in only
three countries—Pakistan, Afghanistan and possibly
Nigeria.
►► This is a great success of the global community.
However, after a number of missed deadlines and
investments of US$20 billion, the eradication goal
has still not been achieved. The challenges of the
‘last mile’ of eradication seem insurmountable. They
comprise political instability and community resistance on one hand.
►► On the other hand, secondary epidemics abide,
initially due to wild-type polio virus imported from
endemic countries and now due to circulating vaccine-derived polio viruses. The latter epidemics
originate from back-mutations of oral polio vaccine
(OPV) viruses regaining neurovirulence under conditions of low immunisation coverage and weak health
systems.
►► Finally, the challenges of the global transition from
OPV to inactivated polio vaccine, of destroying all
OPV stocks, of controlling polio spread from longterm excreters, and of preventing deliberate spread
of de-novo synthesised polioviruses have to be overcome. Under all likely scenarios, polio vaccination
will need to be continued for decades, or indefinitely.
►► We argue that the global community should celebrate the massive reduction in polio cases, and
then shift course from polio eradication to a more
realistic goal of sustained, systematic control, along
with increased investments into routine vaccine delivery systems within the frame of Universal Health
Coverage.

World Health Assembly considered polio a
‘Programmatic Emergency for Global Public
Health’,14 15 and in May 2013 it endorsed the
Polio Eradication & Endgame Strategic Plan
2013–2018 (the ‘Polio Plan’), which calls for
the eradication of all WPV, all cVDPV and
all OPV viruses.6 14 The Polio Plan combined
locally adapted new tactics to strengthen
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national programme with technological innovations (eg,
more effective and safer monovalent and bivalent OPV
formulations) to achieve its main objectives, namely to
stop all WPV transmission by the year 2014 and to speed
up the control of cVDPV outbreaks.14
WPV transmission, however, stopped neither in 2014
(as planned) nor in 2018 (the year planned for certification). In January 2019, the Chairs of GPEI’s main
global advisory bodies issued a joint statement ‘urging all
involved in the effort to excel in their roles’.7 While their
goal to reach ‘every last child’ with vaccines including
polio remains highly commendable, the goal of eradication warrants reconsideration. Unlike smallpox, polio
lacks ideal characteristics for eradication. Smallpox had
a very high manifestation rate and a straightforward
epidemiological case definition, making outbreaks easy
to identify; and a vaccine with the characteristics of a
near perfect intervention tool (eg, heat stable; long-term
immunity, potentially life-long, after one inoculation).
This made eradication possible within slightly more than
a decade between the onset of the programme in 1966
and the last naturally occurring case in 1977—and with a
rather small budget.
But none of these apply to polio: several doses of
OPV are needed to convey immunity in low-hygiene
settings; and the virus may have been spreading for
some time before clinical cases are diagnosed.16 Moreover, the problem of cVDPV has only been realised in
the year 2000 when it was first detected on Hispaniola.17
In addition, suspicions towards polio vaccination among
Muslim populations in the remaining endemic areas has
increased since the Afghanistan war started in 2002.1 2 18
Challenging epidemiolgical developments
Since 2000, secondary epidemics—caused by either a
direct spread of WPV from the remaining endemic countries to neighbouring countries (although no longer
in the past 5 years) or by cVDPV—were reported from
about 30 countries formerly certified as polio-free, most
recently from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Papua New Guinea, Somalia and Syria.4 13 18 19 A total of
21 and 12 WPV cases were reported from Afghanistan
and Pakistan, respectively, in 2018; by 26 June 2019,
the number of new WPV cases reported had reached
already 37 (10 in Afghanistan, 27 in Pakistan).4 Thus,
polio remains endemic in Afghanistan and Pakistan, two
countries which share a porous border. Nigeria, while not
certified as polio-free, has so far reported no new WPV
cases in 2019.4 Regarding cVDPV cases, a total of 104 were
reported for the whole of 2018 (DRC 20, Indonesia 1,
Mozambique 1, Niger 10, Nigeria 34, Papua New Guinea
26, Somalia 12); by 26 June 2019, the total of number of
new cVDPV stood at 20 (Angola 1, DRC 5, Ethiopia 1,
Niger 1, Nigeria 9, Somalia 3).4
Important reasons for continuing transmission are first,
the weak health systems and correspondingly low routine
childhood immunisation coverage in many countries still
2

at risk of polio due to ongoing political instability, underdevelopment and poverty, compounded by the technical
challenges of the GPEI; and second, the perception
that polio eradication is a priority of wealthier ‘Western’
countries, not of the people living in the countries
where elimination proves to be the hardest, as has been
shown in Pakistan.20 21 While there have been repeated
OPV campaigns in the remaining endemic countries
for many years (eg, 6–8 campaigns per year in the critical provinces of Pakistan and Nigeria), routine health
services including immunisation services had in the past
been largely neglected, even disrupted by vertical polio
campaigns,22 and overall vaccination coverage remains
low in several countries and regions.23
The current DRC epidemic has emerged in different
provinces as independent cVDPV type 2 outbreaks, which
now threatens to spread to other neighbouring countries and may endanger the whole of sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA).3 5 By 2016, 155 countries had already replaced
trivalent OPV with a bivalent (types 1 and 3) vaccine; the
DRC outbreak thus demonstrates the weaknesses in polio
surveillance systems and—if not contained—may cause a
general move back to the trivalent OPV.3 4 10 24
The GPEI faces further technical challenges which
incur at least a theoretical risk of future outbreaks. They
include the decades-long excretion of polio-related
viruses in persons with a B-cell defect (this risk may only
be minute as no resulting outbreaks have been identified
since the switch from trivalent OPV), the risk of ongoing
circulation of polio viruses in populations with high IPV
coverage due to low mucosal immunity, the possibility of
an accidental spread of unknowingly stored polioviruses
from laboratories, or even a deliberate spread of de-novo
synthesised polioviruses.6 25 Failure to contain poliovirus
would be a greater risk than with smallpox virus because
resulting outbreaks are less easily identified and thus
contained.
And sadly, even successful eradication of poliovirus
may not mean an end of polio-like illness. Other viruses
from the same family (eg, enteroviruses D68, D71) may
produce flaccid paralysis resembling poliomyelitis, with
outbreaks reported from a number of industrialised
countries in recent years.26 27 The existence of other
causes of disease does not mean that eradication of one
cause should not be attempted. However, it would bring
about the challenge of explaining to the world community why outbreaks presenting with the clinical symptoms
of a disease eradicated at substantial cost continue to
occur.
The costs of eradication
The cost of the GPEI amounts to around US$20 billion
since its initiation. The Polio Plan included total
direct costs of US$5.5 billion, which were increased to
US$7 billion until 2019.5 WHO is currently developing a
new strategic plan for the years 2019–2023, with a budget
of roughly US$4.2 billion.9 Evidently, a high investment
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into a successful eradication programme would be cost-effective, given the long term costs of continuous control
programmes9; however, this would imply that eradication
is technically and politically achievable, which appears
increasingly unlikely.5 20 28 Thirty years after the onset of
GPEI, it remains unclear for how long the international
community will be willing to continue funding polio
eradication efforts. Furthermore, countries in the developing world may no longer accept the relative neglect
of other health sector priorities for the sake of a global
programme that fails to keep its promise.18
The focus on the eradication effort and its repeating
failures is tragic: it obscures that the control of polio has
been a historic success of the global health community.
In this respect, the GPEI has made a positive contribution. The original GPEI plan included routine immunisation as one of the four pillars of eradication. After
initial, purely vertical efforts which harmed existing EPIs,
the polio eradication initiative aimed to strengthen also
horizontal, routine immunisation programmes, and in
some cases even to support weak health services.22 29 30
The EPI brought about major achievements since its initiation in 1974, when immunisation services reached less
than 5% of children in developing countries.31 By 2014,
the mean global coverage of children under 1 year of age
with three doses of DTP vaccine (DTP3) was estimated
at 85%.32 However, major inequalities remain between
and even within countries, with DPT3 coverage rates well
below 50% in numerous second-level administrative units
of SSA.23 32 Hence, further targeted strengthening of the
EPI is needed.

From eradication to control
In 2019, the world ‘is at a critical point in polio eradication’.33 This could be the year to implement the
lessons learnt from GPEI and to move from the eradication goal to sustained polio control, as had already
been proposed by leading experts on smallpox eradication more than 10 years ago.28 It will not be possible to
simply stop GPEI interventions, as the low EPI coverage
in a number of developing countries would rapidly lead
to polio outbreaks, with the risk of re-established polio
endemicity.
Thus, a broad multidisciplinary discussion of all
stakeholders and a careful planning is required to
establish an alternative WHO-led global Polio Control
Programme (PCP). WHO would define minimum immunisation coverage rates to be achieved in all strata of
society in all countries as well as intervention measures
such as targeted mass vaccination campaigns in case of
outbreaks. The phasing out of OPV in exchange to IPV
would continue, but monovalent, bivalent and trivalent
OPV would be stored and employed to fight outbreaks
of symptomatic or asymptomatic (eg, detected through
environmental surveillance) polio. A well-designed PCP
would thus build on the experiences and some elements
Razum O, et al. BMJ Global Health 2019;4:e001633. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001633

of the GPEI, secure the achievements made, but drop the
presently unattainable goal of eradication.
The activities of a PCP would be less demanding and
thus less costly compared with the ongoing massive efforts
of the already excessively long ‘last mile’ of the GPEI,
assuming an underlying law of diminishing returns. With
the shift to PCP, a proportion of GPEI funds could be
reinvested into strengthening EPI in countries with low
vaccination coverage (this would build on the GPEI goal
of transitioning GPEI resources from polio eradication
activities to sustaining polio essential functions while
addressing other public health priorities). More broadly,
as agreed already with the establishment of the sustainable development goals, the global health community
would prioritise establishing Universal Health Coverage
and committing adequate resources to maintain the
gains in healthcare staff and services so far funded via
the GPEI.30
Conclusion
In conclusion, there are two strategies that the world
should not be content with: first, unsystematic and uncoordinated polio control efforts, implemented by individual countries acting on their own. Second, continued
polio eradication efforts offering simply more of the
same. Urging ‘all involved in the effort to excel in their
roles’ to achieve polio eradication is just such a strategy.7
It merely pours more money into an ultimately unsustainable vertical programme.
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